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ENGLISH

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500

Annual Percentage Change
in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshirein S&P 500 with Dividends Included
Year
196549.510.0
1966(3.4)(11.7)
196713.330.9
196877.811.0
196919.4(8.4)
1970(4.6)3.9
197180.514.6
19728.118.9
1973(2.5)(14.8)
1974(48.7)(26.4)
19752.537.2
1976129.323.6
197746.8(7.4)
197814.56.4
1979102.518.2
198032.832.3
198131.8(5.0)
198238.421.4
198369.022.4
1984(2.7)6.1
198593.731.6
198614.218.6
19874.65.1
198859.316.6
198984.631.7
1990(23.1)(3.1)
199135.630.5
199229.87.6
199338.910.1
199425.01.3
199557.437.6
19966.223.0
199734.933.4
199852.228.6
1999(19.9)21.0
200026.6(9.1)
20016.5(11.9)
2002(3.8)(22.1)
200315.828.7
20044.310.9
20050.84.9
200624.115.8
200728.75.5
2008(31.8)(37.0)
20092.726.5
201021.415.1
2011(4.7)2.1
201216.816.0
201332.732.4
201427.013.7
2015(12.5)1.4
201623.412.0
201721.921.8
20182.8(4.4)
201911.031.5
20202.418.4
202129.628.7
20224.0(18.1)
Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-202219.8%9.9%
Overall Gain – 1964-20223,787,464%24,708%

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.

A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.

Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire's individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.

The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.

Who wouldn't enjoy working for shareholders like ours?

What We Do

Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.

In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.

Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”

One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.

Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)

Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.

The Secret Sauce

In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400 million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was \$1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.

The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was \$75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to \$704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.

American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost \$1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from \$41 million to \$302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.

These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at \$25 billion while Amex was recorded at \$22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.

Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its \$1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged \$80 million or so of annual income.

The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.

The Past Year in Brief

Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company's operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at \$30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:

Earnings in \$ billions

2022 Quarter“Operating Earnings”GAAP Earnings We are Required to Report
17.05.5
29.3(43.8)
37.8(2.7)
46.718.2

The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.

A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.

Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from \$147 billion to \$164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing $1.2\%$ of the company's outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire's ownership a bit without any cost to us.

The math isn't complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.

Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?

When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).

Almost endless details of Berkshire's 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.

And that is a promise we can make.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.

That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.

58 Years – and a Few Figures

In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.

And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.

Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.

Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let's first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.

In aggregate, the 500 earned \$1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned \$3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.

At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody's, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.

In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the \$3 billion mark noted above (\$5.9 billion at BNSF and \$4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.

As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.

At Berkshire, there will be no finish line.

Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes

During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about \$32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent \$43.9 trillion.

Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire's operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company's unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.

The \$32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (34 $^{1/2}$ %), corporate income tax payments (8 $^{1/2}$ %) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was \$32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.

And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let's put physical dimensions to the numbers:

  • If you convert \$1 million into newly-printed \$100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.
  • Perform the same exercise with \$1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile into the sky.
  • Finally, imagine piling up \$32 billion, the total of Berkshire's 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.

When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”

* * * * * * * * * * * *

At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America's dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.

I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.

Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner

Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.

Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:

  • The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
  • If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
  • All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
  • If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.

- Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.

- You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.

- Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.

- A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.

- Warren and I don't focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.

- Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.

- There is no such thing as a $100\%$ sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don't count on getting rich twice.

- You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.

- You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.

- Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.

- Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”

And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I will add to Charlie's list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.

A Family Gathering in Omaha

Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.

From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See's kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See's could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?

I know you can't wait to hear the specifics of last year's hustle.

On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See's registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that $6 \frac{1}{2}$ of the $9 \frac{1}{2}$ operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.

Do the math: See's rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up \$400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven't been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See's in the days of Henry Ford's model T works now.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.

February 25, 2023

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

中文译文

伯克希尔业绩与标普500对比

年度百分比变化
伯克希尔每股市场价值标普500（含股息）
年度
196549.510.0
1966(3.4)(11.7)
196713.330.9
196877.811.0
196919.4(8.4)
1970(4.6)3.9
197180.514.6
19728.118.9
1973(2.5)(14.8)
1974(48.7)(26.4)
19752.537.2
1976129.323.6
197746.8(7.4)
197814.56.4
1979102.518.2
198032.832.3
198131.8(5.0)
198238.421.4
198369.022.4
1984(2.7)6.1
198593.731.6
198614.218.6
19874.65.1
198859.316.6
198984.631.7
1990(23.1)(3.1)
199135.630.5
199229.87.6
199338.910.1
199425.01.3
199557.437.6
19966.223.0
199734.933.4
199852.228.6
1999(19.9)21.0
200026.6(9.1)
20016.5(11.9)
2002(3.8)(22.1)
200315.828.7
20044.310.9
20050.84.9
200624.115.8
200728.75.5
2008(31.8)(37.0)
20092.726.5
201021.415.1
2011(4.7)2.1
201216.816.0
201332.732.4
201427.013.7
2015(12.5)1.4
201623.412.0
201721.921.8
20182.8(4.4)
201911.031.5
20202.418.4
202129.628.7
20224.0(18.1)
1965-2022年复合年增长率19.8%9.9%
1964-2022年整体收益率3,787,464%24,708%

注：数据按日历年计算，但以下年份除外：1965和1966年截至9月30日；1967年为截至12月31日的15个月。

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

我的长期合伙人Charlie Munger和我，负责管理一大批人的储蓄。我们感激他们持久的信任——这种关系往往贯穿他们的整个成年生活。正是这些忠实的储蓄者，始终是我写信时最先想到的人。

一种常见的看法是，人们年轻时选择储蓄，期望借此在退休后维持生活水平。这种理论认为，去世时留下的任何资产，通常会留给家人，或者可能留给朋友和慈善机构。
我们的经历有所不同。我们相信伯克希尔（Berkshire）的个人股东大多属于"一旦存钱，终生存钱"的类型。这些人生活优渥，但最终会把大部分资金捐给慈善组织。而这些组织则通过旨在改善无数与原始捐赠者毫无关联的人的生活的支出，重新分配这些资金。有时，结果令人惊叹。

金钱的处置方式会暴露人性。查理（Charlie）和我欣慰地看到，伯克希尔产生的巨额资金流向公共需求，同时，我们的股东很少选择那些引人注目的资产或建立王朝。

谁不愿意为这样的股东工作呢？

我们做什么

查理和我在伯克希尔将你们的储蓄分配于两种相关的所有权形式。首先，我们投资于我们控制的企业，通常收购每家企业的100%股份。伯克希尔指导这些子公司的资本配置，并挑选负责日常运营决策的CEO。在管理大型企业时，信任和规则都至关重要。伯克希尔对前者强调到了异乎寻常——有人会说极端——的程度。失望是难免的。我们对业务错误持理解态度；但对个人不端行为零容忍。

在我们的第二种所有权形式中，我们购买公开交易的股票，从而被动持有一部分业务。持有这些投资时，我们对管理层没有发言权。

两种所有权形式的目标都是对拥有长期有利经济特征和值得信赖的管理者的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有公开交易的股票是基于对其长期业务表现的预期，而不是因为我们将其视为巧妙买卖的工具。这一点至关重要：查理和我不是选股者，我们是选企业者。

多年来，我犯过很多错误。结果，我们如今庞大的企业组合包括少数真正具有非凡经济特征的企业、许多拥有良好经济特征的企业，以及一大批边缘企业。一路上，我投资的其他企业已经消亡，其产品不再受公众欢迎。资本主义有两面性：该体制一方面不断制造越来越多的失败者，同时却喷涌出不断改善的商品和服务。熊彼特（Schumpeter）将这一现象称为"创造性破坏"。

我们公开交易板块的一个优势是——偶尔——很容易以美妙的价格买下美妙企业的部分股权。关键要理解，股票经常以真正愚蠢的价格交易，无论高低。"有效"市场只存在于教科书中。事实上，可上市的股票和债券令人困惑，其行为通常只有在事后才能理解。

控制的企业是另一种类型。它们索要的价格有时高得离谱，但几乎从不以折价估值出售。除非迫不得已，控制企业的所有者绝不会考虑在恐慌式的估值下出售。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

到了这一步，我应该给自己一张成绩单：在伯克希尔管理的58年中，我的大多数资本配置决策不过是马马虎虎。有些时候，我的一些糟糕决策还被大量的好运所拯救。（还记得我们在美国航空（USAir）和所罗门（Salomon）险些遭遇灾难的经历吗？我当然记得。）

我们令人满意的成果是大约十几个真正好决策的产物——也就是大约每五年一个——以及一个有时被遗忘的优势，这个优势有利于像伯克希尔这样的长期投资者。让我们窥探幕后。

秘密配方

1994年8月——没错，1994年——伯克希尔完成了对4亿股可口可乐股票的七年购买，至今我们仍持有这些股份。总成本为13亿美元——在当时对伯克希尔是一笔非常可观的数目。

1994年我们从可口可乐获得的现金股息为7500万美元。到2022年，股息已增至7.04亿美元。每年都在增长，就像生日一样确定无疑。查理和我需要做的只是兑现可口可乐每季度的股息支票。我们预计这些支票极有可能继续增长。

美国运通的经历也大致相同。伯克希尔对美国运通的购买基本完成于1995年，巧合的是，成本也是13亿美元。从这项投资中获得的年度股息从4100万美元增长到3.02亿美元。那些支票似乎也极有可能增加。

这些股息收益虽然令人欣慰，但远谈不上壮观。然而它们带来了股票价格的重要上涨。年底，我们对可口可乐投资的估值为250亿美元，美国运通则记为220亿美元。每项持股现在约占伯克希尔净值的5%，与其多年前的权重类似。

暂且假设我在20世纪90年代犯了一个类似规模的投资错误，一个表现平平、到2022年仅保留了13亿美元价值的投资（例如一只高级30年期债券）。那么这笔令人失望的投资现在仅占伯克希尔净值的0.3%，每年给我们带来大约8000万美元不变的收入。

给投资者的教训：当鲜花绽放时，杂草便黯然失色。随着时间推移，只需少数赢家便能创造奇迹。而且，是的，早点开始并活到90多岁也很有帮助。

过去一年简述

伯克希尔在2022年取得了不错成绩。公司的经营利润——我们所说的经营利润，是指按照美国通用会计准则（GAAP）计算，但不包括持股的资本利得或损失的收益——创下了308亿美元的纪录。查理和我关注这个经营数字，并敦促你们也这样做。未经我们调整的GAAP数字，每个报告日都会剧烈且反复无常地波动。请注意它在2022年杂耍般的表现，这绝不是什么罕见情况：

收益（十亿美元）

2022年季度"经营利润"要求报告的GAAP收益
17.05.5
29.3(43.8)
37.8(2.7)
46.718.2

如果按季度甚至按年度来看，GAAP收益是100%具有误导性的。当然，过去几十年里，资本利得对伯克希尔极为重要，我们预期未来几十年它们仍将显著为正。但它们的逐季波动却被媒体定期且不加思考地大肆报道，完全误导了投资者。

伯克希尔去年的第二个积极进展是我们收购了Alleghany Corporation，一家由Joe Brandon掌舵的财产意外险保险公司。过去我曾与Joe共事，他既了解伯克希尔也懂保险。Alleghany为我们带来了特殊价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使其保险子公司能够执行几乎所有竞争对手都无法采用的宝贵且持久的投资策略。

在Alleghany的帮助下，我们的保险浮存金在2022年从1470亿美元增加到1640亿美元。通过严格的承销，这些资金随着时间的推移有很大机会变成零成本。自1967年收购第一家财产意外险保险公司以来，伯克希尔的浮存金通过收购、运营和创新增长了8000倍。尽管未在我们的财务报表中确认，但这项浮存金一直是伯克希尔的一项非凡资产。新股东可以通过阅读我们每年更新的、关于浮存金的解释（见A-2页）来了解其价值。

每股内在价值在2022年出现了非常小幅的增长，这得益于伯克希尔的股份回购，以及我们两家重要投资对象——Apple（苹果公司）和American Express（美国运通）的类似操作。在伯克希尔，我们通过回购公司1.2%的流通股份，直接提高了你在我们独特业务组合中的权益。在苹果和美国运通，回购则在不耗费我们任何成本的情况下，略微增加了伯克希尔的持股比例。

这笔账并不复杂：当股份数量减少时，你在我们众多业务中的权益就会增加。只要回购是以能增厚价值的价格进行的，每一丁点的减少都有帮助。同样肯定的是，当一家公司为回购支付过高代价时，继续持股的股东就会受损。这种时候，收益只流向卖出股份的股东，以及那位推荐了愚蠢收购的友好但收费昂贵的投资银行家。

需要强调的是，通过增厚价值的回购获得的收益，会在所有方面惠及所有所有者。不妨想象一下，一家本地汽车经销店的三位信息充分的所有者，其中一位负责管理业务。再进一步设想，其中一位被动所有者希望以对另外两位继续持股者具有吸引力的价格，将其权益卖回给公司。当交易完成时，有没有伤害到任何人？那位管理者是否比继续持股的被动所有者受到了某种偏袒？公众有没有受到伤害？

当你听到有人说所有回购都对股东或国家有害，或者尤其对CEO有利时，你听到的不是一个经济文盲，就是一个巧舌如簧的煽动家（这两者并不互斥）。

伯克希尔2022年运营的几乎无穷无尽的细节，都列在K-33至K-66页上。查理和我，以及许多伯克希尔股东，都喜欢仔细阅读那一部分中罗列的大量事实和数字。然而，这些页面并非必读内容。伯克希尔有众多亿万富翁（没错，还有亿万富翁）从未研究过我们的财务数字。他们只知道查理和我——连同我们的家人和密友——在伯克希尔一直持有非常重大的投资，并且他们相信我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。

而这是我们能够做出的承诺。

最后，一个重要的警告：即使是我们更青睐的经营利润这个数字，也很容易被那些想这么做的管理层操纵。这种篡改行为常常被CEO、董事及其顾问们视为高明的手段。记者和分析师也同样对此欣然接受。超出“预期”被赞誉为管理上的胜利。

这种行为令人作呕。操纵数字不需要任何才能：唯一需要的是深深的欺骗欲望。“大胆而富有想象力的会计”——正如某位CEO曾对我描述他的欺骗行为那样——已经成为资本主义的耻辱之一。

58年——与一些数字

1965年，伯克希尔是一家只会一招的小马，是一家历史悠久但注定灭亡的新英格兰纺织厂的所有者。随着这家生意走向末路，伯克希尔迫切需要立即重启。回头看，我当时对问题严重性的认识过于迟缓。

然后好运降临：1967年，国民赔偿保险公司（National Indemnity）成了可购之物，我们将资源转向了保险和其他非纺织业务。

由此开始了我们通往2023年的旅程，这是一条崎岖不平的道路，融合了所有者持续储蓄（即他们留存收益）、复利的力量、我们避免重大错误——以及最重要的一点——美国顺风。没有伯克希尔，美国照样能发展得很好。反之则不然。

伯克希尔如今在一个无与伦比的庞大且多元化的业务组合中拥有重大所有权。让我们先看看大约5000家在纳斯达克、纽交所及相关场所每日交易的上市公司。在这组公司中，包罗了标普500指数的成员，这是一个由大型且知名的美国公司组成的精英集合。
总体而言，标普500成分股公司在2021年共赚取1.8万亿美元。我目前尚未拿到2022年的最终数据。因此，以2021年数据来看，500家公司中只有128家（包括伯克希尔自身）盈利超过30亿美元。事实上，有23家出现了亏损。

截至2022年末，伯克希尔是其中八家巨头的最大股东：American Express（美国运通）、Bank of America（美国银行）、Chevron（雪佛龙）、Coca-Cola（可口可乐）、HP Inc.（惠普）、Moody's（穆迪）、Occidental Petroleum（西方石油）和Paramount Global（派拉蒙全球）。

除这八家被投资企业外，伯克希尔还全资拥有BNSF（北伯林顿铁路公司），并持有BH Energy（伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司）92%的股份。这两家公司的盈利均超过上文提到的30亿美元门槛（BNSF为59亿美元，BHE为43亿美元）。若它们是上市公司，将取代标普500现有两家成员的位置。总而言之，我们旗下这十家控股与非控股的巨头，让伯克希尔比美国任何其他公司都更广泛地与该国的经济未来保持一致。（这一计算排除了养老金基金和投资公司等“受托”业务。）此外，伯克希尔的保险业务——虽通过众多独立管理的子公司开展——其价值也堪比BNSF或BHE。

展望未来，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，以及广泛多元的业务。我们还将避免任何可能导致在不利时机——包括金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失——出现令人生厌的现金需求的行为。我们的CEO将永远是首席风险官——这是一项不可推卸的责任。此外，未来的CEO们将用自有资金购买伯克希尔股票，其个人净资产中有相当大一部分来自伯克希尔股份。而且没错，我们的股东将通过留存收益继续储蓄和繁荣。

在伯克希尔，没有终点线。

关于联邦所得税的一些惊人事实

在截至2021年的十年间，美国财政部收取了约32.3万亿美元的税收，而支出为43.9万亿美元。

尽管经济学家、政客及许多公众对这一巨大失衡的后果各有看法，但查理和我自认无知，并坚信近期的经济与市场预测比无用更糟糕。我们的职责是以这样一种方式管理伯克希尔的运营和财务：随着时间的推移取得可接受的结果，并在金融恐慌或严重的全球性衰退发生时，保持公司无与伦比的持久力。伯克希尔还提供一些对抗恶性通胀的适度保护，但这一属性远非完美。巨额且根深蒂固的财政赤字自有其后果。

那32万亿美元的收入，财政部通过个人所得税（48%）、社会保障及相关收入（34.5%）、企业所得税（8.5%）以及各种杂项税收获取。伯克希尔在十年间通过企业所得税贡献了320亿美元，恰好占财政部所有收入的千分之一。

这意味着——请坐稳——如果美国有大约1000个纳税人能匹敌伯克希尔的缴款，那么其他任何企业以及全国1.31亿个家庭都无需向联邦政府缴纳一分钱税。一个子儿都不用。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

百万、十亿、万亿——这些词我们都会说，但涉及的金额几乎难以理解。我们用实物尺度来感受一下这些数字：

  • 如果你将100万美元换成刚印出的100美元钞票，摞起来将到你的胸口。
  • 对10亿美元做同样的操作——这开始令人激动了！——这摞钞票的高度大约达到三分之二英里（约1公里）高。
  • 最后，想象一下把320亿美元摞起来，这是伯克希尔2012-2021年缴纳的联邦所得税总额。现在这摞钞票的高度超过21英里（约34公里），大约是商业客机通常巡航高度的三倍。
    说到联邦税，持有伯克希尔的个人可以毫不含糊地说：“我在办公室已经交过了。”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

在伯克希尔，我们希望并期待在未来十年缴纳更多的税。我们欠这个国家的丝毫不比这少：美国充满活力的环境为伯克希尔所取得的任何成功都做出了巨大贡献——这种贡献伯克希尔永远需要。我们依赖美国顺风，尽管它不时停歇，但它的推动力总会回归。

我已经投资了80年——超过我们国家历史的三分之一。尽管我们的公民热衷于——几乎可以说是热衷——自我批评和自我怀疑，但我从未见过有哪个时刻对美国的长期赌注是明智的。而且我深信，这封信的任何一位读者未来都不会有相反的经历。

没有什么比拥有一个好搭档更棒

查理和我想法非常相似。但需要我用一整页来解释的东西，他用一句话就概括了。而且，他的版本总是逻辑更清晰，表达也更巧妙——有人可能会说更直白。

以下是他的一些想法，很多摘自最近的一个播客：

  • 世界上到处都是愚蠢的赌徒，他们的表现不会好过耐心的投资者。
  • 如果你没有按照世界的本来面目去看待它，就像透过扭曲的透镜来判断事物。
  • 我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。还有一个相关的想法：尽早写下你想要的讣告——然后按照它去生活。

  • 如果你不在乎自己是否理性，你就不会去努力。那么你就会一直非理性，结果糟糕。

  • 耐心是可以习得的。拥有长久的专注力和长时间集中在一件事上的能力是一个巨大的优势。

  • 你可以从死去的人身上学到很多东西。读读你钦佩和厌恶的逝者的著作。
  • 如果你能游到一艘适航的船上去，就不要在一艘正在沉没的船上舀水。
  • 一家伟大的公司在你不在了之后依然会良好运转；一家平庸的公司则不会。
  • 沃伦和我并不关注市场的泡沫。我们寻找优质的长期投资，并顽固地长期持有它们。
  • 本·格雷厄姆说过：“短期内，市场是一台投票机；长期来看，它是一台称重机。”如果你持续让某样东西变得更有价值，那么总会有明智的人注意到它并开始买入。
  • 投资中不存在百分之百确定的事。因此，使用杠杆是危险的。一串美妙的数字乘以零，结果永远是零。别指望能连富两次。
  • 然而，你不需要拥有很多东西就能致富。
  • 如果你想成为一名伟大的投资者，就必须不断学习。当世界改变时，你也必须改变。
  • 沃伦和我几十年来一直讨厌铁路股，但世界变了，最终美国拥有了四条对美国经济至关重要的庞大铁路。我们很晚才意识到这个变化，但迟到总比不到好。
  • 最后，我将补充查理的两句简短的话，几十年来它们一直是他的决策定论：“沃伦，再多想想。你很聪明，但我是对的。”

事情就是这样。我和查理每次通话都能学到东西。而且，他不仅让我思考，也让我发笑。

我会在查理的清单上加上我自己的一个原则：找一个非常聪明、品格高尚的搭档——最好比你稍微年长一点——然后非常认真地听他说话。

奥马哈的家庭聚会

查理和我毫不羞愧。去年，在我们三年来第一次的股东聚会上，我们一如既往地带着商业推销的热情迎接你们。
一开盘，我们就直奔你的钱包去了。很快，我们的喜诗糖果小摊就卖出了11吨营养丰富的脆糖和巧克力。我们像巴纳姆那样吹嘘，说能保你长寿。毕竟，要不是喜诗的糖果，查理和我怎么可能活到99岁和92岁呢？

我知道你迫不及待想知道去年这场吆喝的具体情况。

周五，商店从中午开到下午5点，我们的糖果柜台完成了2,690笔销售。周六，喜诗在早上7点到下午4点半之间又做了3,931笔交易，尽管在9.5小时的营业时间里，有6.5小时都在放电影和进行问答环节，限制了客流量。

算算看：喜诗在主要营业时段每分钟大约完成10笔销售（两天营业额达到400,309美元），而且所有商品都在同一地点销售，产品101年来基本没变过。亨利·福特T型车时代让喜诗成功的秘诀，今天依然管用。

查理、我，还有伯克希尔的全体同仁，期待着5月5日至6日在奥马哈与你们相见。我们会玩得很开心，你们也一样。

2023年2月25日

沃伦·E·巴菲特

董事会主席

数据对比