BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.610 KIEWIT PLAZAOMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131TELEPHONE 042-4110

October 9th, 1969

To My Partners:

Here is my present estimate of the BPL calendar for the months to come:

(1) This letter - to tell you something of Bill Ruane, the money manager within my knowledge who ranks the highest when combining the factors of integrity, ability and continued availability to all partners. I also want to comment upon the present range of expectations involved in deciding on a bond-stock mix.
(2) Late November - the required thirty days formal notice of my intent to retire from the Partnership at the end of the year.
(3) Early December - a package of publicly available material, as well as some general comments by me relating to our controlled companies. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (owning the textile business, Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company and Sun Newspapers) and Diversified Retailing Company (owning Hochschild, Kohn & Co. and Associated Cotton Shops). I want you to have ample time to study the material relating to such companies before you make any decision to hold, sell or buy such securities after distribution to you in early January. I will solicit written questions from partners (I don't want to talk to you individually about such companies, as I want all partners to obtain exactly the same information) and then have a further mailing late in December, giving all questions received relating to these companies along with my answers, if possible. I still anticipate having a plan enabling partners to promptly convert such controlled company holdings to cash, if they wish.
(4) About January 5th - (a) a cash distribution amounting to at least 56% (probably more - depending upon what percentage of our remaining holdings are sold before yearend) of your January 1, 1969 capital, less any distributions (the regular monthly payments many of you receive) or borrowings by you during 1969, (b) your proportional share of our holdings in Diversified Retailing Company Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. I which, if you dispose of them, will bring 30% - 35% (my estimate of value will be made at yearend) of your January 1, 1969 capital.

We may make substantial additional sales before yearend - if so, the early January cash distribution will be somewhat larger than the 56% mentioned above. If we don't, such sales will be made during the first half of 1970 and an interim distribution made. Residual assets will be sold at appropriate times and I believe not more than 10% of our present asset value will remain after June 30th, 1970 pending a final distribution when all assets and liabilities have been cleaned up.

Unless there is a further substantial decline in the market. I still expect about a breakeven performance before any monthly payments for 1969. We were lucky - if we had not been in liquidation this year, our results would have been significantly worse. Ideas that looked potentially interesting on a "continuing" basis have on balance performed poorly to date. We have only two items of real size left - one we are selling as I write this and the other is a holding of limited marketability representing about 7-1/2% of the outstanding stock of Blue Chip Stamps which we may sell via a registered public offering around yearend, depending upon market conditions and other factors.

(5) March 1st. 1970 - John Harding expects to leave Buffett Partnership. Ltd. and open a branch office in Omaha for Ruane, Cunniff & Stires. Bill Scott and I will be available at BPL offices to help any partners who are desirous of purchasing bonds, tax-free or taxable. We will set aside the month of March to make our services available without cost to those who want to acquire bonds. Because of some experience we have in analysis and purchasing, as well as the access we have to wholesale markets. I think it is likely we can save material elements of cost as well as help select better relative values for those of you who wish to invest in bonds. After April 1st, however, we want to be out of any form of personal advisory activity.
(6) After March, 1970 - Bill and I will continue to office in Kiewit Plaza, spending a very minor portion of our time completing the wind-up of BPL. This will mean filing tax returns for 1970 and probably 1971 resolving minor assets and liabilities etc.

Now, to Bill Ruane - we met in Ben Graham's class at Columbia University in 1951 and I have had considerable opportunity to observe his qualities of character, temperament and intellect since that time. If Susie and I were to die while our children are minors, he is one of three trustees who have carte blanche on investment matters - the other two are not available for continuous investment management for all partners, large or small.

There is no way to eliminate the possibility of error when judging humans particularly in regard to future behavior in an unknown environment. However, decisions have to be made - whether actively or passively - and I consider Bill to be an exceptionally high probability decision on character and a high probability one on investment performance. I also consider it likely that Bill will continue as a money manager for many years to come.

Bill has recently formed a New York Stock Exchange firm, Ruane, Cunniff & Stires, Inc., 85 Broad Street, New York, N.Y. 10004, telephone number (212) 344-6700. John Harding presently plans to establish an office for the firm in Omaha about March 1st, 1970. Bill manages accounts individually on a fee basis and also executes brokerage for the accounts - presently with some portion of the brokerage commissions used to offset a portion of the investment advisory fee. His method of operation allows monthly withdrawals on a basis similar to BPL - as a percentage of capital and unrelated to realized or unrealized gain or loss. It is possible he may form some sort of pooled account but such determinations will be made between him and those of you who elect to go with him. I, of course, will not be involved with his operation. I am making my list of partners available to him and he will be writing you fairly soon regarding a trip he plans to make before yearend to Omaha, Los Angeles and Chicago, so that those of you who wish to meet him may do so. Any of you who are going to be in New York during the next few months can contact him directly.

Bill's overall record has been very good-averaging fairly close to BPL's, but with considerably greater variation. From 1956-1961 and from 1964-1968, a composite of his individual accounts averaged over 40% per annum. However, in 1962, undoubtedly somewhat as a product of the euphoric experience of the earlier years, he was down about 50%. As he re-oriented his thinking, 1963 was about breakeven.

While two years may sound like a short time when included in a table of performance, it may feel like a long time when your net worth is down 50%. I think you run this sort of short-term risk with virtually any money manager operating in stocks and it is a factor to consider in deciding the portion of your capital to commit to equities. To date in 1969, Bill is down about 15%, which I believe to be fairly typical of most money managers. Bill, of course, has not been in control situations or workouts, which have usually tended to moderate the swings in BPL year-to-year performance. Even excluding these factors, I believe his performance would have been somewhat more volatile (but not necessarily poorer by any means) than mine - his style is different, and while his typical portfolio (under most conditions) would tend to have a mild overlap with mine, there would always be very significant differences.

Bill has achieved his results working with an average of \$5 to \$10 million. I consider the three most likely negative factors in his future to be: (1) the probability of managing significantly larger sums - this is a problem you are going to have rather quickly with any successful money manager, and it will tend to moderate performance; I believe Bill's firm is now managing \$20 -\$30 million and, of course, they will continue to add accounts; (2) the possibility of Bill's becoming too involved in the detail of his operation rather than spending all of his time simply thinking about money management. The problems of being the principal factor in a NYSE firm as well as handling many individual accounts can mean that he, like most investment advisors, will be subject to pressures to spend much of his time in activities that do nothing to lead to superior investment performance. In this connection, I have asked Bill to make his services available to all BPL partners - large or small and he will, but I have also told him he is completely a free agent if he finds particular clients diverting him from his main job; (3) the high probability that even excellent investment management during the next decade will only produce limited advantages over passive management. I will comment on this below.

The final point regarding the negatives listed above is that they are not the sort of drawbacks leading to horrible performance, but more likely the sort of things that lead to average performance. I think this is the main risk you run with Bill - and average performance is just not that terrible a risk.

In recommending Bill, I am engaging in the sort of activity I have tried to avoid in BPL portfolio activities - a decision where there is nothing to gain (personally) and considerable to lose. Some of my friends who are not in the Partnership have suggested that I make no recommendation since, if results were excellent it would do me no good and, if something went wrong, I might well get a portion of the blame. If you and I had just had a normal commercial relationship, such reasoning might be sound. However, the degree of trust partners have extended to me and the cooperation manifested in various ways precludes such a "hands off" policy. Many of you are professional investors or close thereto and need no advice from me on managers - you may well do better yourself. For those partners who are financially inexperienced. I feel it would be totally unfair for me to assume a passive position and deliver you to the most persuasive salesman who happened to contact you early in 1970.

Finally, a word about expectations. A decade or so ago was quite willing to set a target of ten percentage points per annum better than the Dow, with the expectation that the Dow would average about 7%. This meant an expectancy for us of around 17%, with wide variations and no guarantees, of course - but, nevertheless, an expectancy. Tax-free bonds at the time yielded about 3%. While stocks had the disadvantage of irregular performance, overall they seemed much the more desirable option. I also stressed this preference for stocks in teaching classes, participating in panel discussions, etc…

For the first time in my investment lifetime. I now believe there is little choice for the average investor between professionally managed money in stocks and passive investment in bonds. If correct. this view has important implications. Let me briefly (and in somewhat oversimplified form) set out the situation as I see it:

(1) I am talking about the situation for, say, a taxpayer in a 40% Federal Income Tax bracket who also has some State Income Tax to pay. Various changes are being proposed in the tax laws, which may adversely affect net results from presently tax-exempt income, capital gains, and perhaps other types of investment income. More proposals will probably come in the future. Overall, I feel such changes over the years will not negate my relative expectations about after-tax income from presently tax-free bonds versus common stocks, and may well even mildly reinforce them.

(2) I am talking about expectations over the next ten years - not the next weeks or months. I find it much easier to think about what should develop over a relatively long period of time than what is likely in any short period. As Ben Graham said: “In the long run, the market is a weighing machine - in the short run, a voting machine.” I have always found it easier to evaluate weights dictated by fundamentals than votes dictated by psychology.

(3) Purely passive investment in tax-free bonds will now bring about 6-1/2%. This yield can be achieved with excellent quality and locked up for just about any period for which the investor wishes to contract. Such conditions may not exist in March when Bill and I will be available to assist you in bond purchases, but they exist today.

(4) The ten year expectation for corporate stocks as a group is probably not better than 9% overall. say 3% dividends and 6% gain in value. I would doubt that Gross National Product grows more than 6% per annum - I don't believe corporate profits are likely to grow significantly as a percentage of GNP - and if earnings multipliers don't change (and with these assumptions and present interest rates they shouldn't) the aggregate valuation of American corporate enterprise should not grow at a long-term compounded rate above 6% per annum. This typical experience in stocks might produce (for the taxpayer described earlier) 1-3/4% after tax from dividends and 4-3/4% after tax from capital gain, for a total after-tax return of about 6-1/2%. The pre-tax mix between dividends and capital gains might be more like 4% and 5%, giving a slightly lower aftertax result. This is not far from historical experience and overall, I believe future tax rules on capital gains are likely to be stiffer than in the past.

(5) Finally, probably half the money invested in stocks over the next decade will be professionally managed. Thus, by definition virtually, the total investor experience with professionally managed money will be average results (or 6-1/2% after tax if my assumptions above are correct).

My judgment would be that less than 10% of professionally managed money (which might imply an average of \$40 billion just for this superior segment) handled consistently for the decade would average 2 points per annum over group expectancy. So-called "aggressively run" money is unlikely to do significantly better than the general run of professionally managed money. There is probably \$50 billion in various gradations of this "aggressive" category now - maybe 100 times that of a decade ago - and \$50 billion just can't "perform".

If you are extremely fortunate and select advisors who achieve results in the top 1% to 2% of the country (but who will be working with material sums of money because they are that good), I think it is unlikely you will do much more than 4 points per annum better than the group expectancy. I think the odds are good that Bill Ruane is in this select category. My estimate . therefore, is that over the next decade the results of really excellent management for our "typical taxpayer" after tax might be 1-3/4% from dividends and 7-3/4% from capital gain. or 9 –1.2% overall.

(6) The rather startling conclusion is that under today's historically unusual conditions, passive investment in tax-free bonds is likely to be fully the equivalent of expectations from professionally managed money in stocks, and only modestly inferior to extremely well-managed equity money.

(7) A word about inflation - it has very little to do with the above calculation except that it enters into the 6% assumed growth rate in GNP and contributes to the causes producing 6-1/2% on tax-free bonds. If stocks should produce 8% after tax and bonds 4%, stocks are better to own than bonds, regardless of whether prices go up, down or sidewise. The converse is true if bonds produce 6-1/2% after tax. and stocks 6%. The simple truth, of course, is that the best expectable after-tax rate of return makes the most sense - given a rising, declining or stable dollar.

All of the above should be viewed with all the suspicion properly accorded to assessments of the future. It does seem to me to be the most realistic evaluation of what is always an uncertain future - I present it with no great feeling regarding its approximate accuracy, but only so you will know what I think at this time.

You will have to make your own decision as between bonds and stocks and, if the latter, who advises you on such stocks. In many cases, I think the decision should largely reflect your tangible and intangible (temperamental) needs for regularity of income and absence of large principal fluctuation, perhaps balanced against psychic needs for some excitement and the fun associated with contemplating and perhaps enjoying really juicy results. If you would like to talk over the problem with me, I will be very happy to help.

Sincerely,

Warren E. Buffett

WEB/glk

巴菲特合伙有限公司

基威特广场610号
奥马哈，内布拉斯加州68131
电话 042-4110

1969年10月9日

致各位合伙人：

以下是我对BPL未来数月日程的当前预估：

(1) 本函——向诸位介绍比尔·鲁恩（Bill Ruane），在我所知范围内，结合诚信、能力以及持续为所有合伙人提供服务这几个因素，他排名最高的资金管理人。同时，我也想就当前在债券与股票组合决策中涉及的预期范围加以评论。
(2) 11月下旬——依规提前三十天正式通知诸位，我计划于年底从合伙企业退休。
(3) 12月上旬——寄送一份公开可获取的资料包，以及我就所控股公司做的一些总体评论。这些公司包括：Berkshire Hathaway Inc.（伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司），旗下拥有纺织业务、伊利诺伊州罗克福德市的伊利诺伊国民银行及信托公司（Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois）、国民赔偿公司（National Indemnity Company）及国民火险与海上保险公司（National Fire and Marine Insurance Company）、以及太阳报业（Sun Newspapers）；还有Diversified Retailing Company（多元化零售公司），旗下拥有Hochschild, Kohn & Co.及Associated Cotton Shops。我希望诸位在1月初获得这些证券的分配后，在决定持有、出售或买入之前，有充足时间研究这些公司的相关材料。我会征集合伙人的书面问题（我不希望与诸位单独讨论这些公司，因为我希望所有合伙人获得完全相同的信息），然后在12月下旬再寄送一份邮件，尽可能附上所有收到的问题及我的答复。我仍计划提供一个方案，让有需要的合伙人能够迅速将这些控股公司持股转换为现金。
(4) 约1月5日——(a) 现金分配，金额至少为你1969年1月1日资本的56%（很可能更高——取决于我们剩余持仓在年底前售出的比例），扣除你在1969年期间获得的任何分配（许多合伙人每月收到的定期付款）或借款；(b) 你在Diversified Retailing Company Inc.及Berkshire Hathaway Inc.持股的按比例份额，若你处置这些持股，将带来你1969年1月1日资本的30%–35%（我将在年底给出估值）。

我们可能在年底前进行大量额外卖出——如果是这样，1月初的现金分配将略高于上述56%。如果没有，这些卖出将在1970年上半年进行，并做一次中期分配。剩余资产将在适当时间出售，我相信在1970年6月30日之后，我们当前资产价值中不超过10%将保留下来，等待所有资产和负债清理完毕后的最终分配。

除非市场出现进一步大幅下跌，否则我预计1969年在扣除任何月度付款前大致持平。我们很幸运——如果今年我们没有处于清算状态，我们的业绩会差得多。那些在“持续经营”基础上看起来可能有趣的标的，总体而言迄今为止表现糟糕。我们只剩下两项真正的大头——一项在我写这封信时正在卖出，另一项是流动性有限的持仓，约占Blue Chip Stamps（蓝筹印花公司）流通股的7.5%，我们可能根据市场情况及其他因素，在年底前后通过注册公开发售卖出。

(5) 1970年3月1日——约翰·哈丁（John Harding）计划离开巴菲特合伙有限公司，并在奥马哈为Ruane, Cunniff & Stires开设一家分公司。比尔·斯科特（Bill Scott）和我将在BPL办公室为希望购买债券（免税或应税）的合伙人提供帮助。我们将留出整个3月，免费为那些想购买债券的人提供服务。由于我们在分析和购买方面有一些经验，并且能够进入批发市场，我认为我们很可能为那些希望投资债券的伙伴节省大量成本，同时帮助选择相对价值更好的债券。但在4月1日之后，我们将退出任何形式的个人咨询活动。
(6) 1970年3月之后——比尔和我将继续在基威特广场办公，花很少的时间完成BPL的收尾工作。这将意味着为1970年以及可能1971年报税，处理小型资产和负债等。

现在谈谈比尔·鲁恩——我们于1951年在哥伦比亚大学本·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）的课堂上相识，自那时起我有相当多的机会观察他的品格、性情和才智。如果苏西（Susie）和我在孩子未成年时去世，他将是三位在投资事务上拥有全权委托的受托人之一——另外两位无法为所有合伙人（无论大小）提供持续的投资管理服务。

判断人类时，尤其是在未知环境下未来行为的判断上，无法消除出错的可能性。然而，决策总是要做的——无论是主动还是被动——我认为，在品格方面，比尔是一个极高概率的正确决策；在投资业绩方面，也是一个高概率的正确决策。我也认为，比尔很可能会在未来许多年继续担任资金管理人。

比尔最近成立了一家纽约证券交易所会员公司，Ruane, Cunniff & Stires, Inc.，地址：85 Broad Street, New York, N.Y. 10004，电话：(212) 344-6700。约翰·哈丁目前计划于1970年3月1日左右在奥马哈为该事务所设立一个办公室。比尔按费用基础单独管理账户，同时也为这些账户执行经纪业务——目前部分经纪佣金用于抵消一部分投资顾问费。他的运作方式允许像BPL一样按月提取——按资本的一定比例，与已实现或未实现的盈亏无关。他可能会组建某种集合账户，但这将由他和你们中那些选择跟随他的人之间决定。当然，我不会参与他的运作。我会将我的合伙人名单提供给他，他很快就会给你们写信，告知他计划在年底前前往奥马哈、洛杉矶和芝加哥的行程，以便那些希望与他见面的合伙人可以会见。如果你们中有人在未来几个月内要去纽约，可以直接联系他。

比尔的总体记录非常好——平均来看与BPL相当接近，但波动要大得多。从1956年到1961年以及1964年到1968年，他个人账户的复合平均年收益率超过40%。然而，在1962年，无疑部分是由于前几年狂热的经验，他亏损了约50%。随着他重新调整思路，1963年大致持平。

虽然两年在业绩表中听起来很短，但当你的净资产下跌50%时，可能会感觉很漫长。我认为，几乎所有在股票市场上运作的资金管理人都让您面临这种短期风险，这是在决定将多少资本投入股票时需要考虑的一个因素。截至1969年，比尔今年下跌了约15%，我认为这与大多数资金管理人的情况相当典型。当然，比尔没有参与控制类投资或套利类投资，而这些投资通常倾向于缓和BPL年度业绩的波动。即使排除这些因素，我认为他的业绩波动性会比我的更大一些（但绝不意味着更差）——他的风格不同，虽然他的典型投资组合（在大多数条件下）会与我的有一定重叠，但总是存在非常显著的差异。

比尔在管理平均500万到1000万美元资金时取得了这些成绩。我认为他未来最可能的三个负面因素是：(1) 管理更大规模资金的可能性——这是你跟随任何成功资金管理人时都会很快遇到的问题，它往往会削弱业绩；我相信比尔的公司现在管理着2000万到3000万美元，当然，他们会继续增加账户；(2) 比尔可能过于陷入日常运营的细节，而不是将所有时间只花在思考资金管理上。作为纽交所公司的主要负责人，同时处理许多个人账户，可能意味着他像大多数投资顾问一样，会面临压力，不得不将大量时间花在对提升投资业绩毫无帮助的活动上。在这方面，我已要求比尔向所有BPL合伙人（无论大小）提供服务，他也答应了，但我也告诉他，如果某些客户使他偏离主要工作，他完全可以自由选择；(3) 未来十年，即使最优秀的投资管理，相对于被动管理可能也只能产生有限的优势。我将在下文评论这一点。

关于上述负面因素的最后一点是：它们并非会导致糟糕业绩的那种缺陷，而更可能是那种导致平庸业绩的因素。我认为这就是你跟随比尔所面临的主要风险——而平庸的业绩并不是那么可怕的风险。

在推荐比尔时，我从事的是我在BPL投资组合活动中一直试图避免的那种活动——一个个人无所得（个人而言），但可能损失惨重的决策。我一些不在合伙企业的朋友建议我不要做任何推荐，因为如果业绩出色，对我毫无好处，而如果出了问题，我很可能招致部分责备。如果我们只是普通的商业关系，这种推理也许有道理。然而，合伙人们给予我的信任以及以各种方式表现出的合作，排除了这种“不插手”政策。你们中许多人是专业投资者或接近专业水平，不需要我提供关于管理人的建议——你们自己可能做得更好。对于那些财务上缺乏经验的合伙人，我认为如果我采取被动立场，把你们交给1970年初碰巧联系你们的最有说服力的推销员，那将是完全不公平的。

最后，谈谈预期。大约十年前，我相当愿意设定一个每年比道指高出十个百分点（即10%）的目标，预期道指平均约为7%。这意味着我们的预期收益率约为17%，当然有大幅波动且无保证——但即便如此，它仍是一个预期。当时免税债券收益率约为3%。虽然股票有业绩不稳定的缺点，但总体而言它们似乎是更可取的选择。我在教学、参加小组讨论等场合也强调过这种对股票的偏好。

在我投资生涯中，我第一次相信，对于普通投资者来说，在专业管理的股票投资和被动债券投资之间几乎没有选择余地。如果这个观点正确，它有着重要的含义。让我简要地（或许有点过于简化地）阐述我所看到的局面：

(1) 我所讨论的情况适用于，比如说，一位处于40%联邦所得税档位，同时还需缴纳一些州所得税的纳税人。目前税法正在提出各种修改，可能会对当前免税收入、资本利得以及其他类型的投资收入的净结果产生不利影响。未来可能还会有更多提案。总体而言，我认为这些变化在多年内不会否定我对当前免税债券与普通股票税后收入的相对预期，甚至可能会轻微强化这种预期。

(2) 我讨论的是未来十年的预期——而不是未来几周或几个月。我发现思考相对长期内会发生什么比思考短期内可能发生什么要容易得多。正如本·格雷厄姆所说：“长期来看，市场是一台称重机；短期来看，它是一台投票机。”我一直觉得，评估基本面决定的重量，比评估心理决定的投票要容易。

(3) 纯粹被动投资于免税债券目前能带来约6.5%的收益率。这种收益率可以用优质债券实现，并且可以锁定投资者希望的任何期限。这些条件可能在3月份我和比尔协助你们购买债券时不再存在，但今天它们存在。

(4) 公司股票作为一个整体的十年预期可能不会超过9%，假设3%的股息和6%的价值增长。我怀疑国民生产总值（GNP）的年增长率不会超过6%——我不相信企业利润占GNP的比例会显著增长——而如果盈利乘数不变（根据这些假设和当前利率，它不应该变化），美国企业整体的估值不应以长期复利超过每年6%的速度增长。这种典型的股票经验可能（对于前面描述的纳税人）产生1.75%的税后股息收入和4.75%的税后资本利得，合计税后回报约为6.5%。税前股息与资本利得的比例可能更像是4%和5%，从而产生略低的税后结果。这与历史经验相差不远，总体而言，我相信未来关于资本利得的税法规则可能比过去更严格。

(5) 最后，未来十年投资于股票的资金中，大概一半将由专业管理。因此，从定义上看，几乎所有专业管理资金的投资者体验将是平均结果（如果我的上述假设正确，则为税后6.5%）。

我的判断是，在持续十年管理的专业资金中，不到10%的资金（这可能意味着仅这一优秀部分平均就有400亿美元）能够每年超过群体预期2个百分点。所谓的“激进管理”资金，不太可能显著优于一般专业管理资金。目前这个“激进”类别中各种等级的资金可能有500亿美元——也许是十年前的一百倍——而500亿美元根本无法“跑赢”。

如果你极为幸运，选择到了那些业绩达到全国前1%-2%的顾问（但由于他们如此优秀，他们将管理大量资金），我认为你不太可能每年超过群体预期4个百分点以上。我认为比尔·鲁恩很大概率属于这个精选类别。因此，我的估计是，在未来十年，我们“典型纳税人”在真正优秀管理下的税后结果可能是：1.75%来自股息，7.75%来自资本利得，合计9.5%。

(6) 相当惊人的结论是，在当前历史上不同寻常的条件下，被动投资于免税债券很可能完全等同于专业管理股票资金的预期，并且仅略逊于极其优秀股票管理的资金。

(7) 关于通胀的一点说明——它与上述计算关系不大，除了它进入了GNP假设的6%增长率，并促成了免税债券6.5%收益率的原因。如果股票产生8%的税后回报，债券产生4%，那么无论物价上涨、下跌还是横盘，股票都比债券更值得持有。如果债券产生6.5%的税后回报，股票产生6%，则相反。当然，简单的事实是：最佳的预期税后回报率最重要——无论美元升值、贬值还是稳定。

所有上述内容都应以对未来评估应有的怀疑态度来看待。对我来说，这似乎是对总是充满不确定性的未来最现实的评估——我提出这些观点，并非对它们的近似准确性有多大信心，只是为了让你们了解我此刻的想法。

你们必须自己决定在债券和股票之间如何选择，如果选择股票，则决定由谁来提供这类股票的咨询建议。在许多情况下，我认为这种决定应很大程度上反映你们对收入稳定性和本金大幅波动缺位的实际需求（以及性情需求），或许还要与对些许兴奋的内心需求以及憧憬（或许享受）真正丰厚结果所带来的乐趣相平衡。如果你们愿意与我讨论这个问题，我将非常乐意提供帮助。

真诚的，

沃伦·E·巴菲特

WEB/glk